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We investigate the relationship between diversity and productivity in Europe using an original 
dataset covering the NUT3 regions of 12 countries of the EU15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, former Western Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom). In so doing, we follow the empirical methodology developed by Ottaviano 
and Peri (2006a) in the case of US cities. The main idea is that, as cultural diversity may affect 
both production and consumption through positive or negative externalities, the joint estimation 
of price and income equations is needed to identify the dominant effect. Based on this 
methodology, we find that diversity is positively correlated with productivity. Moreover, we find 
evidence that causation runs from the former to the latter. These results for EU regions are 
broadly consistent with those found by Ottaviano and Peri for US cities. 
 
                                                      
1 Corresponding author: Giovanni Prarolo, Università di Bologna and FEEM, giovanni.prarolo@unibo.it. 
We thank Andrea Ichino, Francesco Damuri and Giovanni Peri as well as seminar participants at FEEM 
and the University of  Bologna for comments. We thank the European Commission and the Volkswagen 




1.  Introduction 
Cultural diversity has become a central issue for policy-making in the EU. This is the 
result of growing international flows in goods, factors and knowledge that are fostering 
the global interactions among a rising and increasingly diversified number of people. At 
the EU, this global phenomenon is reinforced by the twin processes of deeper 
integration and enlargement.  
The current debate on the issue is ‘double faced’. On the one hand, the official rhetoric 
looks at diversity as an important asset for human development and welfare. For 
instance, at the global level the 2001 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity of the 
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) states that 
“cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature” (Art. 1). 
Similarly, at the EU level diversity is often seen as the core concept of European 
identity as stressed by the motto “United in Diversity” in the proposed European 
Constitution. On the other hand, the general public perceives immigration as very 
problematic. The relevance of the ‘Polish plumber’ in the French debate on the 
European Constitution and the calls for restrictions to immigration in several European 
countries are two revealing examples.  
From an economic point of view, the key question is whether a culturally diversified 
society is more or less efficient than a culturally homogenous one. The answer is not 
obvious and equally ‘double faced’. On the one hand, cultural diversity creates potential 
benefits by increasing the variety of goods, services and skills available for 
consumption, production and innovation (Lazear 1999; O’Reilly Williams and Barsade 
1998; Ottaviano and Peri 2005 and 2006a; Berliant and Fujita 2004). On the other hand, 
cultural diversity generates potential costs as it may entail racism and prejudices 
resulting in open clashes and riots (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003), as well as conflicts 
of preferences leading to a suboptimal provisions of public goods (Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly 1999; Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby 2004).  
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Recent evidence on US data show that richer diversity is indeed associated with higher 
wages and productivity of natives with causation running from the former to the latter 
(Ottaviano and Peri 2005; Ottaviano and Peri 2006a,b). Comparable results are found by 
Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2007) for the UK as well as by D’Amuri, 
Ottaviano and Peri (2008) for Germany. A comprehensive analysis of the effects of 
diversity on productivity across EU countries is, nonetheless, still missing. Our aim is to 
take a first step in this direction. In so doing, we assemble a new dataset covering the 
NUT3 regions of 12 countries of the EU15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, former 
Western Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom). Then, we follow the empirical methodology developed by Ottaviano 
and Peri (2006a) in the case of US cities. The main idea is that, as cultural diversity may 
affect both production and consumption through positive or negative externalities, the 
joint estimation of price and income equations is needed to identify the dominant effect.  
Based on this methodology, we find that diversity is positively correlated with 
productivity. Moreover, through instrumental variable estimation, we find evidence that 
causation runs from the former to the latter. These results for EU regions are broadly 
consistent with those found by Ottaviano and Peri (2005 a,b) for US cities. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the economic 
literature on diversity and places our contribution into context. Section 3 describes the 
dataset. Section 4 discusses the measures of diversity. Section 5 presents some stylised 
facts about the diversity of EU regions. Section 6 introduces the theoretical model. 
Section 7 discusses the results of the econometric analysis. Section 8 concludes. 
2.  The literature on diversity 
The link between cultural diversity and economic performance has attracted 
considerable attention over the last decade. Using cross-country regressions, an early 
paper by Easterly and Levine (1997) shows that richer diversity is associated with 
slower economic growth.
2 Despite strong criticism (see for example Arcand et al 2000), 
                                                      
2 Easterly and Levine (1997) use a fractionalisation index of diversity calculated from the Midas Atlas database. 
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that result has been confirmed by a number of studies. In particular, Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2005) find that going from perfect homogeneity to complete heterogeneity (i.e., 
the index of fractionalisation going from 0 – there is just one group – to 1 – each 
individual belongs to a different group) would reduce a country yearly growth 
performance by 2 per cent. Angrist and Kugler (2003) find a small but significant 
negative impact of migration on employment levels in the EU. La Porta et al (1999) and 
Alesina et al (2003) argue that higher levels of diversity might result in suboptimal 
decisions on public good provisions, consequently damaging growth performance in the 
long-run. They show that diversity is negatively correlated with measures of 
infrastructure quality, illiteracy and school attainment, and positively correlated with 
infant mortality. Similarly, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) find that richer 
diversity is associated with lower levels of social spending and social transfers by the 
government. The interpretation is that ‘redistributive policies’ are less valued in 
ethnically fragmented societies.  
However, the conclusion that diversity has a negative effect on the economy need to be 
further qualified. Collier (2001) argues that diversity has negative effects on 
productivity and growth only in non-democratic regimes. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) 
find that diversity has a more negative effect at lower levels of income (implying that 
poorer countries suffer more from ethnic fragmentation). Easterly (2001) constructs an 
index of institutional quality aggregating data from Knack and Keefer (1995) on 
contract repudiation, expropriation, rule of law and bureaucratic quality. He finds that 
the negative effect of ethnic diversity is significantly mitigated by ‘good’ institutions. 
Moreover, a number of studies relating diversity to urban agglomeration suggest that 
diversity can have also positive economic consequences. Jacobs (1961) sees diversity as 
the key factor of success of a city: the variety of commercial activities, cultural 
opportunities, inhabitants, visitors as well as the variety of tastes, abilities, needs and 
even obsessions are the engine of urban development (Jacobs, 1961, p 137). Sassen 
(1994) studies ‘global cities’ - such as London, Paris, New York and Tokyo – and their 
strategic role in the development of activities that are central to world economic growth 
and innovation, such as financial and other specialised services. A key characteristic of 
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‘global cities’ is the cultural diversity of their population. Bairoch (1985) sees cities and 
their diversity as the engine of economic growth. More recently, Florida (2002) argues 
that diversity contributes to attract knowledge workers, thereby increasing the creative 
capital of cities and the long-term prospect of knowledge-based growth (Gertler, 
Florida, Gates and Vinodrai 2002).  
These insights suggest that cross-country comparisons may not target the correct level 
of aggregation to identify the possible positive effect of diversity. Finer spatial units, 
such as cities, where differences more easily interact, seem more appropriate 
laboratories. The focus on cities also allows one to control for differences in 
institutional quality and stage of development. Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1995) 
examine the relationship between a variety of urban characteristics in 1960 and urban 
growth (income and population) between 1960 and 1990 across US cities. They find 
that racial composition and segregation are basically uncorrelated with urban growth. 
However, segregation seems to positively influence growth in cities with large non-
white communities. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) use the basic specification of 
Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1995) to estimate population growth equations 
across US counties over 1970-2000. Consistently with their result at the country level 
discussed above, they find that diversity has a negative effect on population growth in 
initially poor counties and a less negative (or positive) effect for initially richer counties. 
Following Roback (1982), Ottaviano and Peri (2006a) develop a model of a 
multicultural system of open cities that allows them to use the observed variations of 
wages and rents of US-born workers to identify the impact of cultural diversity on 
productivity. They find that on average, US-born citizens are more productive in a 
culturally diversified environment.  This is robust to the use of instrumental variables, 
thus implying a causal relationship from diversity to productivity. This result is 
qualified in two specific respects. First, local diversity has a negative effect on the 
provision of public goods, which  is consistent with previous findings at the national 
level. Second, the positive effects are stronger when only second and third generation 
immigrants are considered, which suggests that the positive effects are reaped only 
when some degree of integration between communities takes place.  
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The foregoing in insights somehow contrast with earlier findings by Borjas (1995 and 
2003) showing a negative impact of immigrants on the wages of natives and a positive 
impact on capital returns. However, these findings rely on the key assumptions of 
perfect substitution between natives and foreigners as well as on a fixed capital stock. 
Allowing for imperfect substitutability between natives and foreigners as well as 
endogenous capital accumulation, Ottaviano and Peri (2006b) find that the effects of 
immigration on the average wages of natives turn positive and rather large. Moreover, 
they find that the effect is particularly strong for the most educated (college graduates) 
and negative for the least educated (high-school drop-outs). The latter result is 
consistent with analysis showing a negative impact of immigrants on the relative wages 
of less educated workers (Borjas 1994, 1999, 2003; Borjas, Freeman and Katz 1997; 
and to a minor extent Butcher and Card 1991; Card 1990 and 2001; Friedberg 2001; 
Lewis 2003).  
The existing literature is based either on cross-country analyses or focuses primarily on 
the US. This is not only because diversity is one of the hallmarks of the US society, but 
also for the pragmatic reason that US data are richer and of better quality. Recent 
exceptions are Manarcorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2007) and D’Amuri, Ottaviano 
and Peri (2008) who find results similar to Ottaviano and Peri (2006b) in the case of the 
UK and Germany respectively. The present analysis supplements these national studies 
by providing an overview of the relationship between diversity and economic 
performance across a large set of European regions. This represents a relevant addition 
to the literature as insights gained from US analyses may not apply to the EU. First of 
all, contrary to the US, in Europe cultural differences are historically inherited and are 
largely enshrined in national states (with established regional minorities either 
recognised or challenged by the national states). The migration flows over the last two 
centuries (from southern to northern Europe and from the colonies to colonial powers) 
have not dramatically altered this situation and simply led to the establishment of 
relatively stable ethnic communities in some European states. This situation is now 
changing as an increasing flow of people is crossing the EU national borders from 
inside and outside of the EU thereby, which has revived the public debate. Second, as 
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shown by Angrist and Kugler (2003), labor market institutions may be important in 
mediating the effects of immigration on wages and employment and these institutions 
vary a lot between the US and continental Europe.   
3.  The dataset
3 
Our dataset includes demographic, economic and geographical data for over 900 
European regions from 12 countries of the EU15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
former Western Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom). Data are collected at NUTS 3 level (equivalent to county in the 
UK, province in Italy or arrondissement in France) and refer to two different points in 
time: 1991 (1990 for Finland and the Netherlands) and 2001 (2000 for Finland and the 
Netherlands; 1999 for France). The choice of reference years is constrained by the 
availability of Census data in each country (more on this below). 
Economic data include GDP, employment (3-sector level), unemployment, active 
population as well as hotel and restaurant prices. These are used to proxy unavailable 
information on land prices (more on this below). GDP, employment, unemployment, 
and active population are from Eurostat’s Cronos REGIO database. When data are not 
available at NUTS 3 level, they are interpolated by using NUTS 2 data (kindly provided 
by Cambridge Econometrics). Geographical data include the areas (in square Km
2) of 
the region (from the Eurostat’s REGIO database) and a travel time matrix (kindly 
provided by the European Commission DG Regio). Geographical data are used to 
calculate the density of population and the ‘market potential’ of each region. This 
measures the economic centrality of a region and is calculated as the weighted average 
of the GDP of that region and the GDP’s of the surrounding regions, with weights 
inversely related to the travel time (by car).  
Hotel and restaurant prices are used to proxy for local price indexes that are unavailable 
at NUTS 3 level. They have been chosen because typically they are highly correlated 
                                                      
3 The dataset has been developed at Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei with support from the European Commission, 6th RTD 
Framework Programme, Contract n° SSP1-CT-2003-502491 (PICTURE). 
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with the prices of non-tradables, in particular of land, which have been used by 
Ottaviano and Peri (2005) to disentangle the productivity and the amenity effects of 
diversity. Hotel and restaurant prices are derived from the Michelin Guide of each 
country for the reference years. By exploiting the rating system of Michelin, we have 
constructed price indexes that refer to restaurants and hotels of comparable quality 
across countries and cities. In particular, the hotel (restaurant) price for each region is 
calculated by averaging across the prices of all two-houses hotels (two forchettes 
restaurants) reported in the guide for that region. Hotel prices are for a two-bed room 
with no breakfast included. Restaurant prices exclude fixed-price menus. 
Demographic data are constructed from the National Statistical Institutes of each 
country (mostly from national Census Surveys or Registry data) and cover population 
by gender, age (0-14; 15-39; 40-64; 65 or more), marital status (unmarried, married, 
divorced, widow) and level of education (basic or not educated, secondary school, 
degree or higher education - harmonized using the ISCED classification of the OECD) 
and citizenship (country of birth for the UK and Ireland) grouped by main area of 
provenience to achieve  a common classification (autochthonous, other UE countries, 
other European countries, Africa, America, Asia, Oceania, unknown).  
4.  Measuring diversity 
‘Cultural diversity’ is the central variable of our analysis. As such, it has to be carefully 
measured. In particular, its measurement requires two steps.
4 First, it is necessary to 
find one or more criteria to distinguish ‘cultural groups’ within the population. In 
ethnology the ‘right list’ of groups (Fearon 2003) would be based on a process of ‘self-
categorisation’ where people recognize the distinction of groups and anticipate that 
significant actions are or could be conditioned on belonging or not to a group. A direct 
approach to the identification would involve carrying out worldwide surveys. Because 
of the costs involved, no such experiment has been carried out and indirect approaches 
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have been used in literature. Indirect approaches require the choice of one or more 
‘identity markers’ as a basis for the identification of the groups. Extra and Yağmur 
(2004) compare the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of four possible ‘identity 
markers’ (nationality, country of birth, language spoken at home and self-
categorisation). Table 1 summarises their results.  
                                                                                                                                                            
4 Whittaker (1972) distinguishes α−diversity (the diversity of a given population, or inventory diversity), and β−diversity  (the 
variation of diversity across different populations, or differentiation diversity). Here, we will only use α−diversity measures, as we 
only refer to diversity within regions. 
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Table 1: Criteria for the definition and identification of population groups in a 
multicultural society (P/F/M = person/father/mother)  




•  relatively easy to establish 
•  (intergenerational) erosion through 
naturalisation or double CIT 
•  CIT not always indicative of 
ethnicity/identity 
•  some (e.g., ex-colonial) groups have 




•  relatively easy to establish 
•  intergenerational erosion through 
births in immigration country 
•  CoB not always indicative of 
ethnicity/identity 
•  invariable/deterministic: does not 
take account of dynamics in society 
(in contrast of all other criteria) 
Self-categorisation 
(SC) 
•  touches the heart of the matter 
•  emancipatory: SC takes account of 
person’s own conception of 
ethnicity/identity 
•  subjective by definition: also 
determined by language/ethnicity of 
interviewer and by spirit of times 
•  multiple SC possible 
•  historically charged, especially by 
World War II experiences 
Home language 
(HL) 
•  HL is the most significant criterion of 
ethnicity in communication processes 
•  HL data are prerequisite for 
government policy in areas such as 
public information or education 
•  complex criterion: who speaks what 
language to whom and when? 
•  language is not always core value of 
ethnicity/identity 
•  useless in one-person households 
(source: Extra and Yağmur 2004:31) 
At national level, the best known and most widely used effort to distinguish ‘cultural 
groups’ within countries was carried out by a team of Soviet ethnographers in the early 
1960s and published as Atlas Narodov Mira. The Soviet team mainly used language to 
define groups, but sometimes included groups that seem to be distinguished by some 
notion of race rather than language, and quite often used national origin (Fearon 2003). 
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In the attempt of clearing from potential sources of arbitrariness (why should one use 
language alone in one case, language and race in a second one and language and 
national origin in a third one?) Alesina et al (2003) develop separate measures based on 
linguistic and religious groups (as well as ethnic groups, as a combination of the two) in 
a sample of about 190 countries.  
At regional and urban level, data are much more scattered. For European regions, the 
only identity marker available is ‘citizenship’ (‘country of birth’ for the UK and 
Ireland), which is subject to intergenerational erosion. For the US, Ottaviano and Peri 
(2005, 2006a) compare measures of urban diversity based on country-of-birth, 
language-spoken-at-home, citizenship and race. They find that such measures are highly 
correlated across cities. This is true to a lesser extent also for religion. The bias 
introduced by the citizenship-based measure of diversity may therefore not be too large. 
In Europe, however, the problem of intergenerational erosion is reinforced by the fact 
that Member States have different citizenship laws and therefore different naturalisation 
rates. We will discuss in Section 7 the implications for the econometric analysis and 
how we deal with them. 
The second step towards diversity measurement involves the construction of a synthetic 
index. A plethora of indexes have been proposed from biology to economics. Here we 
adopt two of the most used indexes in the relevant economic literature. The first is 
simply the share of foreigners in the whole resident population. The second is the 
fractionalisation  index. Given a population of  individuals divided in i=1…M  




















where   is the number of individuals that in city c belong to group i. The index is 
widely used in biology, where it is known as the Simpson index of diversity. It 
corresponds to the complement to one of the Herfindal index of concentration across 
groups. It measures the probability that two individuals randomly extracted from the 
ci L
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population belong to different groups. The index varies between 0 and 1 and increases 
with both the number of groups and the evenness of the distribution of individuals 
across groups. 
5.  Diversity in European regions 
We can now use the database presented in Section 3 and the indexes of diversity 
introduced In Section 4 to discuss the main features of the European landscape of 
diversity and how this has changed over the period 1991 to 2001. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of foreigners in European regions in 1991.
5 At that time, 
diversity characterised only regions in the core of Europe: France around Paris and 
Lyon, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany’s large cities and the south of the UK. 
Regions of Spain, Italy, Austria and Nordic countries were fairly homogenous. In Italy 
and Spain the percentage of residents with foreign citizenship was below 2% 
everywhere. The situation has rapidly changed over the 1990s. In 2001 (see Figure 2) 
most of Austrian regions have reached a percentage of foreigners higher than 8% and 
the percentage of foreigners in most regions of Italy and Spain is between 4 and 8%. 
Overall, the share of foreigners increased from 5.6% in 1991 to 6.9% in 2001. 
The data also allow for some analysis in terms of migrants’ provenience. Among the 
regions of which we have data, the largest group of foreign population is represented by 
migrants from other EU15 countries (representing around 1.9% of population in 1991), 
but this group has not significantly increased over the decade. Migrants from Africa 
represent the second largest group (1.4% of population in 2001) followed by Asian and 
other European (1% and 1.3% of population in 2001, respectively). Contrary to 
migrants from the EU, the number of migrants from those three groups has been 
growing very fast with an increase of over a third during the decade. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the percentage of foreigners respectively from inside and 
outside the EU15. Figure 3 shows a geographical pattern that is very similar to the one 
                                                      
5 Here and in what follows, we will refer to ‘foreigner’ as ‘foreign-born’ in the UK and Ireland, and ‘with foreign citizenship’ 
elsewhere.  
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shown in Figure 1 with the highest shares in the core regions of Europe and very little 
outside. Hence, internal migration flows tend to reproduce old core-periphery patterns. 
Figure 4 is more similar to Figure 2 with relatively high shares also in the regions of 
Austria, Italy and Spain. Contrary to migrants from the EU, recent migration flows from 
outside seem to affect to a greater extent the regions of more recent immigration, 
particularly those that are close to the Mediterranean (Italy and Spain) and the Eastern 
border (former East Germany, Austria and Sweden). 
 
Figure 1. Shares of foreigners in European regions, 1991 
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Figure 2. Shares of foreigners in European regions, 2001 
 
 
Figure 3: Share of foreigners from within the EU15, 2001 
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Figure 4: Share of foreigners from outside the EU15, 2001 
 
 
Table 2 shows the most and the least diverse EU regions in 1991 and 2001 ranked 
according to the Simpson index of diversity (fractionalization) discussed in Section 4. 
The share of foreigners in total population is also reported. Urban regions are at the top 
of the ranking both in 1991 and 2001. French and UK regions reach the highest score in 
both cases, joined in 2001 by Bruxelles and surroundings. Interesting features emerge 
comparing the distribution of diversity in and around Paris and London. While in Paris 
diversity is more concentrated in the banlieu (Seine-Saint-Denis being more diverse 
than Paris), the opposite is true for London where diversity is more concentrated in the 
core (Inner London being more diverse than Outer London). Vienna appears in the top 
ten only in 2001, following the immigrant inflows from Eastern Europe after 1989. 
Rural regions are at the bottom of the ranking both in 1991 and 2001. In 1991, the group 
of regions at the bottom end shows nearly no diversity and includes only rural Italian 
and Spanish regions. The picture is different in 2001. Some degree of diversity also 
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characterises the most homogenous regions and some of the Italian and Spanish regions 
have been replaced by rural regions in France and Belgium in terms of lack of diversity. 
 
Table 2: Most and least diverse European regions, 1991 and 2001 
Most diverse  1991   2001 
 Simpson 
Share of 
foreigners  Simpson 
Share of 
foreigners
Inner London (UK)  0.334  27.8%  Inner London (UK)  0.409  33.6% 
Seine-Saint-Denis (FR)  0.261  24.1%  Seine-Saint-Denis (FR) 0.315  27.9% 
Outer London (UK)  0.230  18.0%  Outer London (UK)  0.304  22.9% 
Paris (FR)  0.228  21.7%  Paris (FR)  0.243  21.9% 
Bruxelles (BE)  0.223  28.6%  Hauts-de-Seine (FR)  0.208  18.1% 
Hauts-de-Seine (FR)  0.190  17.4%  Val-de-Marne (FR)  0.203  19.4% 
Val-de-Marne (FR)  0.166  17.6%  Val-d'Oise (FR)  0.191  17.8% 
Val-d'Oise (FR)  0.162  15.7%  Bruxelles (BE)  0.182  27.1% 
Rhône (FR)  0.136  13.8%  Wien (AT)  0.181  16.4% 
Leicestershire (UK)  0.136  9.1% Berkshire  (UK)  0.175  13.1% 
Least diverse  1991   2001 
 Simpson 
Share of 
foreigners  Simpson 
Share of 
foreigners
Taranto (IT)  0.001  0.1%  Benevento (IT)  0.005  0.4% 
Terni (IT)  0.001  0.1%  Vandée (FR)  0.005  0.4% 
Albacete (ES)  0.001  0.1%  Taranto (IT)  0.004  0.6% 
Badajoz (ES)  0.001  0.1%  Oristano (IT)  0.004  0.3% 
Jaen (ES)  0.001  0.1%  Ypres (BE)  0.004  0.3% 
Ciudad Real (ES)  0.001  0.1% Enna  (IT)  0.004  0.4% 
Zamora (ES)  0.001  0.1%  Tâmega (PT)  0.004  0.5% 
Isernia (IT)  0.001  0.1%  Brindisi (IT)  0.004  0.4% 
Campobasso (IT)  0.001  0.1%  Eeklo (BE)  0.004  0.2% 
Chieti (IT)  0.000  0.0%  Dixmude (BE)  0.002  0.6% 
Source: 
Authors’ calculation based on national Censuses data for population by country of birth for 
Ireland and the UK and citizenship for the other countries (see Section 3).  
 
 
Data are for 1991 and 2001 except for the Netherlands (1990 and 2000) and France (1991 
and 1999). 
Notes:  Finnish and some German regions are excluded (1991 data are not available). 
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It is common sense to believe that US cities are very diverse ‘melting pots’, while 
European cities are generally considered more homogenous both within (low α-
diversity, in the classification of Whittaker 1972) and between themselves (low β-
diversity, following the same classification). Although a direct comparison is not 
possible, useful indications concerning the validity of this statement can be drawn by 
comparing Table 1 with the data presented by Ottaviano and Peri (2005, Table 2) for US 
cities.
6 A more complex picture seems to appear.  The most diverse US cities are Los 
Angeles and New York with a share of foreign born in total population of respectively 
37% and 31% in 1990 (corresponding to diversity indexes in the range of 0.5 to 0.6). 
The percentage is not dramatically different from the percentage of foreign population 
in the most diverse European regions in 2001 (Inner London reached 33% in 2001). 
Differences are apparently larger at the bottom. The least diverse European regions have 
a share of foreigners in total population that is smaller than 0.5% whereas their 
counterparts in the US (such as Cincinnati and Pittsburgh) reach a share of 2.3%. 
Nevertheless, European regions have levels of α-diversity that are comparable with 
those of US cities and span a range of diversity (β-diversity) that is not significantly 
smaller than the range of diversity spanned by US cities.
6.  Theoretical model 
To structure the empirical analysis, we use the theoretical framework developed by 
Ottaviano and Peri (2006), who model an open system of cities in which ‘diversity’ 
affects both the productivity of firms and the satisfaction of consumers through 
localised external effects. Both the model and the identification procedure of the impact 
of diversity on city dwellers build on Roback (1982). 
The framework considers a system of a large number N  of regions, indexed by 
c=1,…,N.  There are two factors of production, labour (perfectly mobile) and land 
                                                      
6 Ottaviano and Peri (2006) use ‘country of birth’ as identity marker. Data are therefore directly comparable with our data for the 
UK and Ireland but not for the rest of the regions (for which we use ‘citizenship’). The higher values of the Simpson index for US 
cities also depends on the larger number of ‘cultural’ groups used by Ottaviano and Peri (as the Simpson index varies with both the 
number and relative size of groups).   
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(fixed). The total amount of land is exogenously allocated to regions and Hc denotes the 
amount land in region c.  To ensure that the rental income of workers, if any, is 
independent of residence and therefore does not affect migration choices, land is 
assumed to be owned by locally resident landlords. 
Total supply of labour is L and each worker inelastically supplies one unit of work. Lc 
denotes the number of workers living and working in region c. In order to rule out 
commuting, intraregional commuting costs are zero and interregional commuting costs 
are prohibitive, so we can focus on the interregional allocation of workers.  
Workers are identical in terms of attributes that are relevant for market interactions, but 
they differ in terms of non-market attributes, which exogenously classifies them into M 
different groups (‘cultural identities’) indexed by i=1,…,M. The diversity of regional 
population is measured by dc (calculated as in (1)). Diversity affects both production and 
consumption as an externality that can be either positive or negative. The objective is to 
identify the dominant externality (consumption or production) and its sign.  
As a result of those assumptions, the interregional allocation of land is exogenously 
given while the interregional allocation of labour will be endogenously determined in 
equilibrium. Similarly, the degree of cultural diversity for the system is exogenously 
given, while intraregional diversity is endogenously determined by the entry decisions 
of firms and the migration decision of workers. 
Preferences are defined over the consumption of land H and a homogenous good Y that 
is freely traded among regions. The utility of a typical worker of group i in region c is 
given by: 
(2)  , where 0<μ<1.  
μ μ
ic ic c U ic Y H d A U
− =
1 ) (
In  (2),  Hic  and  Y  ic  are land and good consumption, while AU(dc)  captures the 
consumption externality associated with local diversity dc. If the first derivative AU’(dc) 
is positive, then diversity has a positive effect on workers utility (i.e., an amenity 
effect). If the first derivative AU’(dc) is negative, then diversity has a negative affect on 
workers utility (i.e., a disamenity effect). Workers move to the region that offers them 
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the highest utility. Given (2) and utility maximisation, the indirect utility function is 
given by: 
 
(3)   μ μ
μ μ μ μ
c c
ic
c U ic p r
E




1 ) ( ) 1
 
where Eic is workers expenditures. Given our assumption about land ownership, Eic will 
consist of wage only: Eic=wc.  
As to production, good Y is supplied by perfectly competitive firms using both land and 
labour as input. The typical firm in a region c produces according to the following 
technology: 
 
(4)  , where 0<α<1.  
α α




In (4), Hic and L  ic are land and labour inputs, while AY(dc) captures the productivity 
externality associated with local diversity dc. If the first derivative AY’ (dc) is positive, 
then diversity has a positive effect on firms’ productivity (i.e., a positive productivity 
effect). If the first derivative AY’ (dc) is negative, then diversity has a negative affect on 
firms productivity (i.e., a negative productivity effect). Given (4) and profit 
maximisation, it is possible to solve for the marginal cost pricing condition: 
 
(5) 














As Y is freely traded, its price will be the same everywhere and we can choose it as 
numeraire, i.e. pc=1.
 7  
                                                      
7 With reference to the empirical analysis, it is important to note that by imposing pc=1, we are de facto requiring that the law-of-
one-price holds for tradable goods and that land rents are a reasonable approximation of non-tradable goods prices (in the model, as 
land is the only fixed factor, differences in local prices are entirely driven by land rents).  
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We can now determine the spatial equilibrium. This is identified by a set of prices for 
labour and land (wc, rc) with c=1,…,N such that in all regions workers and landlords 
maximise their utilities given their budget constraints, firms maximise profits given 
their technological constraints, factor and product markets clear. At the equilibrium, no 
worker has an incentive to move. For an interior equilibrium to exist (i.e., Lc>0 for any 
c=1,…,N), workers must be indifferent between locations, i.e. their indirect utility is 
equalised across regions: 
(6)  N c k V V ik ic ... 0 , = ∀ =  
In what follows, we will refer to (6) as the ‘free migration condition’. Similarly, in 
equilibrium no firm has an incentive to exit or enter the market. This is ensured by the 
marginal cost pricing condition that, given the choice of numeraire, can be re-written as: 
(7)    ) ( ) 1 (
1 1
c Y c c d A w r
α α α α α α
− − − =
In what follows, we will refer to (7) as the ‘free entry condition’.
8 In order to use the 
model for the empirical investigation, it is necessary to solve for the rent and wage 
levels at the equilibrium allocation. This requires solving together the free migration 
condition (6) and the free entry condition (7) while taking account of (3). The result is 
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and the ‘rent  equation’:  








c U c Y
U Y










μ /ν and ν is the value of the indirect utility function at the 
equilibrium (the same across all regions). 
 
                                                      
8 The free migration and the free entry conditions can then be solved to determine the spatial allocation of workers. A complete 
discussion is given in Ottaviano and Peri (2006).  
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Equations  (8) and (9) give the relation between diversity and factors prices and 
represent the theoretical foundation of our empirical investigation. In the wake of 
Roback (1982), they must be estimated together as the estimation of only one of them 
would run into an identification problem. To see this, consider estimating equation (9). 
A positive correlation between diversity and wages would be consistent with both a 
disamenity effect (AU’(dc)<0) and a positive productivity effect (AY’(dc)>0). 
Analogously, a positive correlation between diversity and rents would be consistent 
with both an amenity effect (AU’(dc)>0) and a positive productivity effect (AY’(dc)>0). 






























































  iff dominant consumption disamenity   AY’(dc)<0 
 
Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of the spatial equilibrium and the 
associated identification problem. Regional nominal wages (w) are measured along the 
vertical axis and regional land rents (r) along the horizontal one. Downward sloping 
lines depict the ‘free entry condition’, i.e. the combination of rents and wages that make 
firms indifferent across locations. Their downward slope reflects the fact that firms can 
earn the same profit in different regions provided that higher wages correspond to lower 
rents and vice-versa. Upward sloping lines depict the ‘free migration condition’, i.e. the 
combination of rents and wages that make workers indifferent across locations. Their 
upward slope reflects the fact that workers can achieve the same utility (‘real wage’) in 
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different regions provided that higher rents correspond to higher wages and vice-versa. 
The intersection between the two curves gives the wage and rent equilibrium. 
Local diversity dc acts as a shift parameter on the two curves. A positive shock to 
diversity shifts the free entry condition upward (downward) if diversity has a positive 
(negative) productivity effect. It shifts the free migration condition downward (upward) 
if diversity has a consumption amenity (disamenity) effect. We can therefore identify 
the dominant effect of diversity by looking at the impacts of shocks on the equilibrium 
factor prices. 
Suppose A represents the initial equilibrium at factor prices (r,w). Suppose also that 
there is a shock to diversity and we observe higher wages (w’>w) after the shock.  
Figure 5 shows that in principle this could be associate either with a upward shift of the 
free entry condition (point B) indicating a positive productivity effect; or with an 
upward shift of the free migration condition (point C) indicating a negative effect on 
workers quality of life (or consumption disamenity). To distinguish whether higher 
wages signal higher productivity or worse quality of life, additional information is 
needed. In Figure 5 that is provided by rents: whereas higher productivity is associated 
with higher wages and higher land rents (point B), worse quality of life is associated 
with higher wages but lower land rents (point C). By symmetry the foregoing arguments 
can be applied to downward shifts of the firm and worker indifference lines. A 
reduction in productivity shifts the firm line downward, which reduces both wages and 
land rents (point D). An improvement in the quality of life shifts the worker line 
downward, thus decreasing wages and increasing land rents (point E). 
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Table 3 summarizes the overall identification procedure that will be used in Section 7 to 
assess whether and to what extent diversity affects productivity across EU regions. 
Table 3: Identification strategy 
  Rent  variation 
  Positive  Negative 
Positive Positive  productivity 
effect 
Disamenity effect  Wage 
variation 
Negative  Amenity effect  Negative productivity 
effect 
 
Before moving to the empirical results, it is however important to discuss the 
consequences of Europe’s low labour mobility for the empirical implementation. 
Consider the extreme case of no labour mobility. In such case, the ‘free migration 
condition’ becomes vertical and wage differentials measure productivity differentials. If 
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this were the case for Europe, we could simply estimate the wage equation and identify 
wage responses to diversity shocks as productivity effects. Since labour mobility in 
Europe is low but it is not absent (particularly among migrants), we will nevertheless 
estimate the rent regressions in order to rule out any possibility that higher wages reflect 
the disamenity effects of diversity.  
7.  Econometric results 
Before turning to the empirical investigation, it is important to highlight the additional 
limitations we face when working with European data with respect to US-based studies 
tackling our same issues.  
Most of the studies surveyed in Section 2 (Borjas 1994, 1999 and 2003, Card 2001, 
Ottaviano and Peri 2005 and 2006 among others) construct city-specific economic 
indicators (such as wages of skilled/unskilled native/foreign born) directly from micro-
level dataset, usually the PUMS dataset. With this fine level of disaggregation 
individuals sharing similar characteristics (education level, work experience, ethnicity, 
age, etc.) are merged together in internally homogeneous cells and then well defined 
relations are investigated. For example, a standard question in this literature is whether 
the inflow of migrants has an impact on white native’s hourly wages. This kind of 
investigation can be performed for different level of education, tenure and ethnicity. Our 
European study relies instead on meso-level data, meaning that we have information on 
regional averages instead of having aggregates built from individual data. This 
limitation makes it impossible to discriminate, for example, between natives’ and 
foreigners’ wages. At the same time we cannot identify whether natives and foreigners 
are high or low skilled: we only know, for example, the share of workers having tertiary 
education, irrespectively of the regional distribution of natives and foreigners. 
We now present the results of the empirical analysis, which is carried out in four steps. 
First, following the identification strategy set out in Section 6, we estimate the wage 
equations. As wage data for European regions and cities are scattered and not available 
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at NUT 3 level, we use GDP per capita as a proxy.
9 Under the model assumption of free 
firm mobility the two measures are equivalent, as profits are equalised across regions 
and income differentials are entirely driven by wage differentials. 
Second, we estimate the rent equations. EU-wide comparable data for land rents at city 
level are not available and data for a close proxy such as house prices are only available 
for a restricted number of major cities. However, in our theoretical model, rents de facto 
capture non-tradable good prices, which we proxy by the average prices (in logs) of 
two-forchettes restaurants as detailed in Section 3.
10
Third, since our independent variable ‘diversity’ is potentially endogenous, we perform 
instrumental variables (IV) estimations in order to net out the (possibly positive) effect 
running from wages to diversity and the (possibly negative) effect running from rents to 
diversity.  
First step: Income regressions 
The income equation we estimate is the following: 
(11)   ln yc= D r + β divc + ϕ
I Xc+ e c 
where c indexes the NUTS3 provinces. Once we exclude formerly Eastern Germany 
provinces, we have 844 NUTS 3 observations and a number of NUTS 2 regions equal to 
171 so that the average number of provinces included in a region is around five. As 
already discussed, the dependent variable (ln yc) is GDP per capita (in logs). The key 
regressor is the province’s diversity (divc).  We use two measures of diversity: the 
Simpson index (see Section 4) and the simple share of foreigners in total population. In 
some specifications, this will be accompanied by the Simpson index calculated only 
among foreigners as in Ottaviano and Peri (2006).
11 We include a set Xc of standard 
control variables such as the share of agriculture in total employment (agric) to control 
for differences in industrial structure and the share of inhabitants with at least secondary 
                                                      
9 REGIO also contains data for ‘Compensation of employees’ but scattered and only available at NUTS 2 level. 
10 Where data availability makes computation possible, the correlation between restaurant prices and house prices is typically large 
and positive. For example, in a sample of 12 major Italian cities such correlation was roughly 70 per cent in 2001. 
11 As from Section 3 population is classified by citizenship in all countries apart from the UK and Ireland for which we use the 
‘country of birth’ . 
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education (educ) to control for differences in human capital endowments.
12 The density 
of population (densc) is introduced to control for those ‘non-pecuniary’ externalities that 
derive from sheer proximity of economic actors.
13 Market potential (mpotc) controls for 
the ‘pecuniary’ externalities that derive from the agglomeration of economic activities, 
as highlighted by the ‘new economic geography’ literature (see Redding and Venables 
2004; Ottaviano and Pinelli 2006). In all regressions, we introduce NUTS 2 region fixed 
effects, Dr. Region fixed effects (Dr=1 for the all the NUTS3 regions belonging to a 
specific NUTS 2 region; 0 otherwise) control for those characteristics, such as 
institutions and other NUTS2-specific variables that apply to all the provinces 
(NUTS3). When NUTS2 fixed effects are introduced, only the provincial deviations 
from the NUTS2 baseline is left to be explained.  
Table 4 shows the results of the basic income regressions, estimated with OLS. Robust 
standard errors are also reported in brackets as heteroskedasticity often characterises 
cross-regional analyses. Columns (1) and (2) report the results of specifications where 
the only regressors are the overall Simpson index and the share of foreigners plus the 
Simpson index calculated among foreigners only. The diversity indices are positive and 
strongly significant, suggesting positive correlations with the log of GDP per capita, 
which is our wage proxy. NUTS2 dummies already explain a lot of variation: 
regressions including NUTS2 dummies alone show R-squared around 0.69. 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of diversity indices significantly adds explanatory power. In 
columns (3) and (4) we replicate the two previous estimations adding some of the 
controls described above. The coefficients of diversity indices are a bit smaller but still 
strongly significant. The coefficients of controls show expected signs, except the one of 
market potential that is, however, not significant. The share of agriculture has a negative 
coefficient, which is significant in column (3), consistently with most findings in 
literature (see, for example, Bivand and Brundstad 2003). The human capital variable 
has a positive and strongly significant coefficient, consistent with the growth literature 
                                                      
12 Ssee Temple (1999) for a review of the recent literature on income and growth regressions. 
13 Local external effects can be positive, due to easier non-market interactions leading to technological externalities (see Ciccone 
2002; Ciccone and Hall 1996) or negative, due to higher congestion and consequent waste of resources that make interactions 
difficult. 
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(Temple 2001). Finally, the density of population has a positive coefficient hinting at 
positive agglomeration effects as in Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Ciccone (2002). 
Table 4: wage regressions - OLS 
Dep.Variable:  log(GPDpc)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
5.73068***  3.66791***  
Simpson Index 
[1.60738]  [0.76727]  
 4.82905***  3.21975*** 
Share of Foreigners 
 [0.82310]  [0.50362] 
 0.94970***   0.34025** 
Simpson Index Among Foreigners
 [0.14410]  [0.16062] 
   -0.00816**  -0.00648 
Share of Agriculture 
   [0.00364]  [0.00414] 
   0.02387***  0.02138*** 
Human Capital 
   [0.00436]  [0.00490] 
   0.00001*  0.00002*** 
Density 
   [0.00001]  [0.00001] 
   -0.00001  -0.00001 
Market Potential 
   [0.00001]  [0.00001] 
NUTS 2 Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  787 787 679 679 
R-squared  0.80 0.82 0.88 0.89 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Observations are weighted for working population. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Under the realistic assumption of limited labour mobility, in the light of Figure 5 such 
results would point at a positive effect of diversity on firms’ productivity. Nevertheless, 
in the presence of labor mobility, higher wages in more diverse regions could simply 
reflect aversion to diversity rather than a genuine effect on productivity. To rule out this 
possibility, we now study the relationship between diversity and local prices. 
Second step: Price regressions 
The price equation we estimate is the following: 
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(12)   ln pc= D r + γ divc + ϕ
P Xc  +e c 
The dependent variable (ln pc) is the log of average restaurant price in the NUTS3 
region. As before, the key regressor is regional diversity (divc.). Standard control 
variables are included together with NUTS2 region fixed effects, as in the income 
regression.  
Table 5 shows the results of the prices regressions following the same structure of Table 
4. All regression have large explanatory power once we control for NUTS2 fixed 
effects. This implies that most of the variation in restaurant prices is not explained by 
local NUTS3 characteristics but possibly by less ‘local’ determinants. However, 
coefficients are positive and significant for all the diversity measures, thus revealing a 
(small) positive relation between diversity and land rents. This small effect is consistent 
with low labour mobility and thus a vertical free migration condition. The coefficients 
of control variables are never significantly different from zero. The exception is the 
coefficient on the share of agriculture. This is negative and marginally significant in 
specifications (3) and (4), confirming that a higher specialisation in agriculture is 
negatively associated with productivity.  
Following our identification strategy, the positive signs of the diversity measures’ 
coefficients rule out the possibility that diversity acts as a consumption disamenity and, 
thus, point out a positive correlation between diversity and productivity. 
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Table 5: Restaurant prices regressions - OLS 
Dep.Variable: log(RestPrice)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1.64327***  1.80630***  
Simpson Index 
[0.33582]  [0.48860]  
 1.14742***  0.90911*** 
Share of Foreigners 
 [0.27731]  [0.31238] 
 0.24145***   0.18509** 
Simpson Index Among Foreigners
 [0.08272]  [0.08788] 
   -0.00486  -0.00510* 
Share of Agriculture 
   [0.00299]  [0.00294] 
   0  0.00001 
Density 
   [0.00001]  [0.00001] 
   -0.00001  0 
Market Potential 
   [0.00001]  [0.00001] 
NUTS 2 Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 686  686  630  630 
R-squared 0.96  0.96  0.97  0.97 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Observations are weighted for working population. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Third step: Instrumental variables 
Short of a randomized experiment, we cannot be sure that the positive correlation found 
between diversity and productivity reveals a causal link from the former to the latter due 
to possible reverse causation. We address this concern through instrumental variables 
(IV). The idea is to substitute our potentially endogenous diversity measures by a set of 
proxies correlated with the change in the diversity of regions from 1991 to 2001 but not 
otherwise correlated with the residuals of regressions (11) and (12). The related 
literature has proposed two approaches to construct such instruments. The first build on 
the idea that migrants enter through ‘gateways’ and tend to settle in their proximity due 
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to the presence of costs of travelling and spreading information as well as the existence 
of ethnic networks (Ottaviano and Peri 2006). In this case, the distance from such 
‘gateways’ is presumably highly correlated with diversity and exogenous to local 
income, prices and productivity. The second approach is the ‘shift-share methodology’ 
firstly applied by Card (2001) and, more recently, by Saiz (2003) and Ottaviano and 
Peri (2006). In the latter methodology, which we follow in this section, the key idea is 
that migrants tend to settle close to where migrants of the same provenience already 
reside. Accordingly, the predicted end-of-period composition of a region’s population in 
2000 can be computed on the basis of its beginning-of-period composition in 1990 by 
attributing to each group in the region its average growth rate in the country to which 
the region belongs to from 1990 to 2000. Alternatively, one could use the average 
growth rate in the EU as a whole. We prefer the national growth rate as there are 
differential behaviours of different ethnic groups that are country-specific. These 
differential behaviours arise from the heterogeneous nature of European countries’ 
populations: different languages, different colonial history of sending countries and 
different cultures. In Figures 6 and 7 (where “Rest” indicates foreigners from Oceania 
and unknown origin) we report the composition of foreign population for years 1990 
and 2000 respectively. It is easy to spot patterns that are more likely to be country-
specific than widespread across European countries.  
  30 
 
Figure 6: Composition of foreign population in 1990 
 
 
Figure 7: Composition of foreign population in 2000 
 
 
The procedure we use to build our instruments relies on the assumption that in 1990 the 
distribution of foreigners in the different NUT3 regions of a country were only driven 
by non-economic drivers of location choices of the immigrants, such as the existence of 
previously formed enclaves. We are confident that, at least for countries in which 
migrants began to settle in late years, this can hold. Examples of this kind of countries 
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are Austria, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain that in 1990 hosted around or 
less than 1% of immigrants.  
To construct the predicted shares of foreigners, we start with building a nation-wide 
growth rate gnf for each ethnic group f (Europe, America, Asia, Africa and Rest of the 
World) in each country n. Formally:  
gnf =(Nnf2000 - Nnf1990) / Nnf1990       
where Nnf1990 and Nnf2000 are the number of inhabitants of ethnic group f in country n in 
years 1990 and 2000 respectively. Then, for each NUTS3 region c belonging to country 
n, we construct the predicted number of inhabitants in year 2000 as:  
N’cf2000 = Ncf1990 (1 + gnf ) 
Then, for each NUTS3 region, we construct the total predicted population in 2000, 
N’c2000, by summing the N’cf2000 across all ethnic groups f. Finally, we follows 
expression (1) to compute d’c as the predicted  Simpson Index for each NUTS3 region. 
An analogous procedure is applied to compute the predicted share of foreigners in each 
NUTS3 region, defined as total population minus the autochthonous. 
The results of the IV estimations of wages and prices regressions are reported in Table 
6. In the wage regressions both the coefficients of the Simpson Index and of the share of 
foreigners turn out to be smaller than the OLS estimates in Table 5. They are, however, 
still strongly significant, implying that the positive ‘pull effect’ of migrants going to 
places with higher wages has been netted out by the instrument. In fact, the first stage 
regression shows large F-tests and not negligible R-squared, indicating that instruments 
are not weak. The coefficients of the Simpson Index among foreigners also remain 
positive but lose their significancy. Finally, the controls show similar values and are 
always significant as in Table 5, with the exception of market potential.  
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Table 6: Instrumental variable regressions 
Dep.Variable:   log(GPDpc) log(RestPrice) 
  Second Stage 
2.44676***  2.24448***  
Simpson Index 
[0.70145]  [0.72176]  
 2.30350***   0.82383** 
Share of Foreigners 
 [0.50461]  [0.41814] 
 0.1233   0.02727 
Simpson Index Among Foreigners
 [0.19007]  [0.12543] 
-0.01017*** -0.00956** -0.00417 -0.00697** 
Share of Agriculture 
[0.00359] [0.00385] [0.00307] [0.00281] 
0.02184*** 0.02123***     
Education 
[0.00381] [0.00453]     
0.00002*** 0.00002***  0  0.00001** 
Density 
[0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
-0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001  0 
Market Potential 
[0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] 
NUTS 2 Dummies  yes  Yes  yes  yes 
Observations 555  555  508  508 
R-squared 0.90  0.97  0.93  0.93 
  First Stage 
0.52830***  0.52040***  
Predicted Simpson Index 
[0.09187]  [0.09399]  
 0.61680***  0.63185*** 
Predicted Share of Foreigners 
 [0.07202]  [0.07524] 
 0.64574***  0.69154***  Predicted Simpson Index  
Among Foreigners   [0.03884]  [0.04032] 
Partial R-squared  0.43  0.67 | 0.51  0.41  0.70 | 0.48 
F-test  33.07  37.9 | 173.7  30.65  36.4 | 166.0 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Observations are weighted for working population. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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In price regressions the previously described ‘pull effect’ should be negative: we expect 
that, other things being equal, migrants decide to settle in places where prices are lower. 
This seems indeed to be the case when we instrument the Simpson Index: its coefficient 
becomes bigger, meaning that, if any, the effect of the price level on diversity is 
negative, leading to downward biased estimates in specification (3) of Table 5. Turning 
to the last specification, the coefficient on the share of foreigners is not significantly 
different from the OLS regression and the coefficient on the Simpson Index among 
foreigners is not significant.  
Overall, the values and the pattern of significance of the IV results trace the ones of the 
OLS specifications (3) and (4) in Table 5, pointing at a positive causal relationship from 
diversity to productivity possibly accompanied by an amenity effect of diversity on 
consumption. 
8.  Conclusions 
Growing evidence on US cities suggests that on average US-born citizens are more 
productive in a culturally diversified environment. This is robust to instrumental 
variables techniques, thus implying a causal relationship from diversity to productivity. 
In the case of Europe, someway similar results have been found for the UK and 
Germany. The present paper has supplemented these national studies by providing an 
overview of the relationship between diversity and economic performance across a large 
set of European regions. This represents a relevant addition to the literature as insights 
gained from US analyses may not readily apply to the EU given different migration 
history and different institutional frameworks. .
Based on an original dataset covering the NUT3 regions of 12 countries of the EU15 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, former Western Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom), we have found that 
diversity is positively correlated with productivity and that causation runs from the 
former to the latter.  
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